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I. INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of New Echota,2 the most notorious of the nearly seventy treaties
created to perfect Indian removal toward the end of the Andrew Jackson presidency (term
of office: 1829-1837),3 serves as a totemic reminder of the fate of North American Natives
and their engagement with international law. The legal rationalizations that justified
removal ultimately forced between 100,000 to 125,000 southeastern Natives of the United
States to relocate.4 Notwithstanding improprieties associated with the conclusion of the
treaty itself (amplified by “whisky and other inducements”5), the treaty also serves as an
indirect expression of the “enlarged philanthropy” and underlaying formalism that
influenced the western civilizing mission (mission civilisatrice).6 This formalism reflected
a Christian entitlement to land that European nations had asserted and applied among
themselves in their colonial endeavors,7 and it entered American jurisprudence as part of
this western inheritance.
Within the United States historical context, this underlying rationale had less to do
with Native sovereignty and self-determination and more to do with Antebellum struggles
with federalism.8 Early American republicanism divided power among executive, judicial,
and legislative branches. Calibrating the checks and balances among these newborn
chambers and in relation to states’ rights created many early nineteenth century

2

See Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-Cherokee, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 [hereinafter Treaty of New
Echota].
3
See The U.S. Foreign Policy on Indian Removal and Its Impact on Democracy, ESRI,
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html?appid=7bf38b6b77b6412caf95e636ed9616af
[https://perma.cc/PYD3-34BY] (last visited June 23, 2020) (noting almost 70 treaties).
4
See Christina Snyder, How the Forced Removal of the Southeast’s Indians Turned Native Lands into
Slave Plantations, ZÓCALO (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2018/01/02/forcedremoval-southeasts-indians-turned-native-lands-slave-plantations/ideas/essay/ [https://perma.cc/J2DAJYD9] (estimating 100,000); Trail of Tears, HIST.COM (July 7, 2020) ,
https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/trail-of-tears [https://perma.cc/GWT4-KSAX]
(estimating nearly 125,000).
5
JOHN P. BROWN, OLD FRONTIERS: THE STORY OF THE CHEROKEE INDIANS FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
DATE OF THEIR REMOVAL TO THE WEST, 1838, at 498 (1938).
6
See Alfred Balch to Andrew Jackson, Jan. 8, 1830, LIB. CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/maj.01074_0281_0284/?sp=1&st=text [https://perma.cc/639B-H3VL]
(noting that “[t]he removal of the Indians would be an act of seeming violence. But it will prove in the end
an act of enlarged philanthropy.”). For a discussion of the emergence of the late 18 th century idea of the
civilizing mission as a broadly interpreted western counter to barbarism, see generally ILYA LAZAREV, THE
ENLIGHTENMENT, PHILANTHROPY AND THE IDEA OF SOCIAL PROGRESS IN EARLY AUSTRALIA: CREATING A
HAPPIER RACE? (2018). On its contorted philanthropic purpose in terms of French, British, and American
imperialism, see Kodjo Afagla, Shattering the Civilizing Claims of Colonialism: George Lamming’s
Natives of My Person, 3 REVUE DU CAMES, LITTÉRATURE, LANGUES ET LINGUISTIQUE 69 (2015).
7
Edward Dumbauld, John Marshall and the Law of Nations, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 38, 54 (1955).
8
See Guy C. Charlton, Aboriginal Rights and Constitutional Conflict: The Marshall Court, State and
Federal Sovereignty, and Native American Rights under the 1789 Constitution, 8 AM. INDIAN L.J. 149, 150
(2019) (citing Reginald Horsman).
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jurisdictional and political uncertainties.9 Complicating this federal-state interface was the
historically less considered constitutional reference to Indian tribes,10 which itself
constituted a third sovereign sphere in the mindset of early American founders.11 However,
the federal-state narrative dominated attention, and it produced seedlings of legal
formalism that would attach “rights of soil” to the successors of metropolitan rule and not
to the Native peoples who claimed the ancestral hunting grounds as homeland for
millennia.
What Enlightenment rationale oriented early Confederation Congress committee
reports toward the conclusion that the “‘right of soil’ and territorial sovereignty belonged
to the United States and that tribes could `remain only on her sufferance’[?]” 12 Moreover,
why did this simple presumption assign superior English rights to land in America? Rights
acquired by conquest provide a partial answer, and was unquestionably part of the law of
nations at this time.13 As the United States Supreme Court held in Harcourt v. Gaillard
(1827), “[w]ar is a suit prosecuted by the sword; and where the question to be decided is
one of original claim to territory, grants of soil made flagrante bello by the party that fails,
can only derive validity from treaty stipulations.”14 However, this classical principle
subordinated territorial claims to the exercise of effective control over the seized territory.15
In fact, the conquest of the North American Indians did not result immediately with the
founding of the Jamestown colony in 1607, nor was that the settlers’ initial intention.16 The
resolution of the Indian question remained a contested issue for more than 200 years.
Imputing the right of soil to colonists, as opposed to Natives, needed time to take
shape. European descendants began to compartmentalize and minimize the moral
dissonance associated with colonization that would achieve broader expression in the form
of the fraudulent Treaty of New Echota, and broadest expression in the form of Manifest
Destiny. Although popular history has tended to periodize and magnify the singular
9

Note the high political stakes involved in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the power
of judicial review by the Supreme Court); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (depriving states of
the power to tax the federal government); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (holding a state law
unconstitutional).
10
The U.S. Constitution references Indian Tribes in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (excluding Indians not
taxed); art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (regulating commerce with Indian tribes); and the U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2
(regarding apportionment, excluding Indians not taxed).
11
See Kevin Washburn, Moving Forward on Native American Rights, UI CTR. HUM. RTS. (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://uichr.uiowa.edu/programs/racial-equity-and-human-rights-series/moving-forward-on-nativeamerican-rights/ (30:52 time mark).
12
Charlton, supra note 8, at 153.
13
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 288-89 (1905) (noting that “subjugation as a
mode of acquiring territory” was among the earliest of accepted principles governing the law of nations).
14
Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 528 (1827).
15
See Marcelo G. Kohen, Conquest, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW__ (2015).
16
Jamestown, and all early North American settlements, were founded as entropôts, akin to the Kontors of
the Hanseatic League and fondachi of Italian city states, to promote international trade on the Atlantic
seaboard coastline, not as a springboard into the conquest of the North American interior. See James
O’Mara, Town Founding in Seventeenth-Century North America: Jamestown in Virginia, 8 J. HIST.
GEOGRAPHY 1 (1982) (discussing the initial purpose for the founding of the colony).
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significance of Columbus’s landing in the West Indies in 1492, the appropriation of this
land space necessitated legal justification.17 The right of soil became an important construct
of the colonial mindset of entitlement, and its elements extended far beyond fifteenth
century claims of title by discovery.18 The right of soil attached first to the question of
sovereignty before it grew into a question attaching to the acquisition of citizenship.19 The
sovereign implications of the right of soil would become particularly important in the early
nineteenth century due to competitions over the North American interior, and it would also
serve as a salve to anoint the fraudulent conveyance at New Echota, which importantly
helped to rewrite the course of American expansionism.
This article investigates the mindset that created a treaty mask that turned a blind
eye to fraud. The dispossession of Native treaty guarantees depended on another treaty—
the Treaty of New Echota. This irony also depended on the blind eye turned toward the jus
soli principle, or perhaps the reformulation or birthright citizenship to explain how the
reformulated principle overlooked Native possessory interests. The settler notion of jus soli
carried deep within it an exclusionary idea about how sovereignty was to be asserted.
Jus soli is the Latin rule that assigns nationality to a person born to the soil. The
factor connecting citizenship to nationhood is the geographical place where the person is
born, not the citizenship status of the parents. The principle grew out of the early modern
expression that based personal claims to land and inheritance on birthright connections to
the sovereign domain. It appeared in common law as early as 1608 in Calvin’s Case, where
the birthright citizenship principle was extended to the postnati.20 It was readily received
into the infant American republic’s construction of jus gentium, which jurists conceived to
be a species of universal law.21 In Calvin’s Case, the King’s Bench ruled that a Scotsman
was not an alien, although alien born to England, and could claim testamentary benefits to
land in England because he was born to British soil.22 Jus soli dominated the assignment
of nationality throughout most of the Americas because it promoted immigration to a
17

Most immediately, note the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which intended to calm the fast-rising dispute
between Spain and Portugal over newly-discovered land. The agreed upon division line (following a
meridian line 370 leagues west of the Cap Verde Islands) granted lands east of the line to Portugal and
lands west of the line to Spain. On the status and treatment of Amerindians, and on Spanish rights to
conquest, see FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIO DE INDIS (1531); BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, BREVÍSIMA
RELACIÓN DE LA DESTRUCCIÓN DE LAS INDIAS (José Miguel Martínez Torrejón ed. 2006) [1552].
18
See Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 387, 388
(2006) (influentially describing settler colonialism as an invasion to be construed in terms of structural
developments, not epiphenomenal events).
19
An 1822 Indian Commission report to the James Madison administration held that “[t]he right of soil, or
the absolute property . . . belong[ed] to the Sovereign, or State under whose authority the discovery and
settlement were made.” JEDIDIAH MORSE, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF THE UNITED STATES
ON INDIAN AFFAIRS 279 (1822) (comprising a narrative of a tour performed in the summer of 1820 under a
commission from the President of the United States, for the purpose of ascertaining, for the use of the
government, the actual state of the Indian tribes in our country).
20
Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 ER 377, 394 (K.B.) (establishing in common law the jus soli (birthright
citizenship) principle.
21
See Dumbauld, supra note 7, at 38-39 (citing Chief Justice John Marshall’s belief).
22
Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 ER 377at 377-78 (discussing the facts of the case).
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continent bereft of labor and surfeit of land.23 Yet, the settler mindset circumvented jus
soli’s application to persons most obviously defined by the principle—the Natives who
were born to the soil of the Americas. The interesting presumption, as noted by United
States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823) was that
this principle did not actually apply to the Natives. He wrote, while the Europeans:
respected the rights of the Natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate
dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence
of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession
of the natives. These grants have been understood by all, to convey a title to
the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.24
Marshall referenced this expression of dominion at the outset of the case,25 noting
the corporate creation under the seal of English King James I of a land conveyance to the
first Colony of Virginia in 1609.26 This credential was his initial point of reference for the
ensuing discussion about good title to lands. Historian Peter d’Errico noted Marshall’s
fundamental assumption that the history of the Natives, apart from what may be read as a
softening or maturation of his thinking in the later Worcester case,27 did not actually begin
with the Natives or considerations of jus soli, but with the construction of monarchical
sovereignty and the chain of title that linked from that point forward.28
A second Latin principle, jus sanguinis, established the competing rule of law.29 It
based a child’s nationality on the nationality of the parents through the bloodline
relationship, not on the geographical place where the person is born. Jus sanguinis
predominated throughout Europe due to the continent’s more restrictive immigration
practices.30 It influenced early twentieth century European citizenship due to dogmatic
definitions of race, ethnicity, and nationhood.31 However, the rise of liberalism and human

See James Brown Scott, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 58, 58-59 (1930).
Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) [hereinafter Johnson v.
M’Intosh].
25
Id. at 543.
26
Scott, supra note 23, at 543-44.
27
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
28
Peter d’Errico, John Marshall, Indian Lover?, 39 J. West (2000),
https://www.umass.edu/legal/derrico/marshall_jow.html [https://perma.cc/66BQ-VD42].
29
See Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in CITIZENSHIP
TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 18, 19 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer
eds., 2001) (noting the commonly adopted classification schemes of jus soli and jus sanguinis). This binary
contraposition is now antiquated and now admits to hybrid formulations. See generally Gerard-René de
Groot & Olivier Vonk, Acquisition of Nationality by Birth on a Particular Territory or Establishment of
Parentage: Global Trends Regarding Ius Sanguinis and Ius Soli, 65 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 319 (2018).
30
See Weil, supra note 29, at 18 (noting jus sanguinis historically formed to protect and preserve national
ethnic character).
31
See Christian Joppke, Citizenship between De- and Re-Ethnicization, 44 ARCHIVES EUROPÉENNES DE
SOCIOLOGIE, 429, 436 (2003).
23
24
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rights after WWII broadened the understanding of jus sanguinis and changed European
notions about membership in political community.32
Although state practice in the Americas favored jus soli, jus sanguinis left an early
and indelible impress on the Americas. The sixteenth century viceroyals, who ruled over
the formative political divisions and audencias (regional capitals) of the New World, and
their subordinates, the encomenderos, who lorded over the massive territories that would
ultimately transform into the modern latifundia system, subdued the Native populations of
Central and South America as peninsulares. They were the direct Spanish-born surrogates
of the crown who based their claims to the New World on the status jus sanguinis provided.
Their bloodline carried with it the pedigree, the permission, the capital, the charters, the
subordinates, and the slaves to dominate the New World.
Peninsulares also imported to the Americas a blood-based elitism that spread an
enduring pigmentocracy across the hemisphere, producing hierarchically descending
admixtures of creoles, mestizos, mulatos, and moriscos, bookended by blancos and
indígenas.33 In an ethno-geographic sense, the ascriptive attribute of jus sanguinis and its
association with European ethnicity and identity politics contrasted with and ultimately
yielded to the functional attribute of jus soli, which stimulated immigration and abetted
territorial acquisition and expansion.34 However, the separation of jus soli and jus sanguinis
was not as neat as these heuristic categories suggest. Hybridized classes of pigmentocracy
endured, only to be magnified by the early seventeenth century importation of African
slaves.
The jus soli principle powerfully but subtly affected the post-colonial entitlement
to land in the New World. It impacted a trilogy of Cherokee cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court,35 each penned by Chief Justice Marshall. These cases meant to
balance the rule of law while addressing the recognized abridgment and ultimate
dispossession of Native ancestral territory and treaty rights, all of which were framed
totemically by the fraudulent Treaty of New Echota.
The first of these cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), provided the controlling
principle that impacted Native sovereignty claims: the European discovery of America
“gave exclusive title to those who made it,” and that such a priority of this discovery
doctrine “necessarily diminished” the power of Indian nations “to dispose of the soil at

32

See generally William Safran, Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to
Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 313 (1997)
(discussing ascriptive and functional constructions of nationality and changing notions of membership in
political community).
33
The Museo Nacional del Virreinato, in Tepotzotlán, Mexico houses an anonymous 18 th century oil on
canvas painting depicting stylized 16 racial groupings that represent the Sistema de castas colonial. On the
caste system generally and as mostly applied in India, see LOUIS DUMONT, HOMO HIERARCHICUS: ESSAI
SUR LE SYSTÈME DES CASTES (1966).
34
See Weil, supra note 29.
35
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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their own will, to whomsoever they pleased.”36 The case associated the discovery doctrine
with the phrase “of the soil,” referencing this connection eight times in the judgment.37
However, these telluric references attached as the intellectual and historical default position
of benefit only to the colonists after their migratory arrival in the New World, and not to
the indigenous inhabitants who had historically occupied these homelands. This ascription
of migratory significance to colonists while denying “of the soil” rights to the Natives drew
from a bedrock principle that would rationalize Native displacement, secure colonial
entitlement, rework a principle imported from roman law, and apply it to the westerners
who constructed it. It would serve as a jurisprudential talisman to assert Christian authority
and secure an undisturbed chain of title linking royal authority to republican rule. It
selectively wove political and historical concepts into “a garment fit for a king and yet free
of any king’s claims,” producing “a legal theory suitable for a ‘democratic’ empire,”38
dressed up in part by the Treaty of New Echota. To discuss this connection between the
European Enlightenment value assigned to the discovery doctrine, and its relation to the
principle of jus soli, it is first important to place into context the circumstances leading to
the signing of the fraudulent treaty.
II. THE BETRAYAL
John Ross (1790-1866; Kooweskoowe) served as Principal Chief of the Cherokee
Nation between 1828-1866.39 He was a creative, subtle and “skilled political operator,”40
privately educated, half Scottish, and one-eighth Cherokee.41 Although unable to speak
Johnson v. M’Intosh, at 574 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the global reach of the discovery
doctrine, see generally Blake A. Watson, The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on Native
Land Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 507 (2011).
37
Johnson v. M’Intosh, at 545 (associating the phrase with owners and proprietors); 563 (proprietors who
could not be “devested” of their rights); 570 (establishing one of the first principles of colonial law); 574
(relating to rightful occupancy; connecting to the original fundamental principle of discovery); 575
(relating to the exclusive right to acquire); 586 (allowing for reservations and stipulations); and 603
(connecting to powers of government).
38
d’Errico, supra note 28.
39
Ross rose through the ranks of the fractious, clannish, and confederated structure of the Cherokee Nation.
Following 1817 land cession deals that resulted in a geographic split of the Cherokee, along with the
creation of the Cherokee Nation West (of the Mississippi River), Ross joined and eventually became leader
of the consolidated National Council in 1828, and he assumed that position until his death in 1866. See
Walter H. Conser, Jr., John Ross and the Cherokee Resistance Campaign, 1833–1838, 44 J.S. HIST. 191,
193 (1978).
40
STEVE INSKEEP, JACKSONLAND: PRESIDENT ANDREW JACKSON, CHEROKEE CHIEF JOHN ROSS, AND A
GREAT AMERICAN LAND GRAB 7 (2016).
41
Interethnic relations among Cherokees and white traders and backwoodsmen of the ante-Revolutionary
period were common, and many of the “leading men” of the Cherokee had more white than Indian blood.
Under the former laws of the Cherokee Nation, “anyone who could prove the smallest portion of Cherokee
blood was rated as Cherokee, including many of one-sixteenth, one-thirty-second, or less of Indian blood.”
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIANS NORTH OF MEXICO 913 (Frederick Webb Hodge, ed., 1907). For more,
see generally THEDA PERDUE, MIXED BLOOD INDIANS: RACIAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE EARLY SOUTH
36
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Cherokee fluently, he grew up among Cherokee children and Cherokee leaders such as
Pathkiller (Nungnoheeahdahee) and Charles Renatus Hicks favored him.42 Ross’s fluency
in English, his previous service as an Indian agent for the United States government, and
his diplomatic ability to elide between cultures affirmed his standing as a major negotiating
asset in the Cherokees’ bid to preserve tribal sovereignty in the face of encroaching United
States interests. After Pathkiller and Hicks died within weeks of each other, Ross assumed
a leadership position and one year later became Principal Chief.43 He guided the Nation
through a period of factional politics, forced migration, internal Civil War, the United
States Civil War (politically siding with the Confederacy), and reconstruction.44
Of the many challenges in his career, history settles on one seminal event. On
December 29, 1835, he and a delegation of Cherokees were in route to Washington, D.C.
for negotiations on tribal sovereignty. Unknown to him, a group of twenty other Cherokees,
led by Major John Ridge (Ca-nung-da-cla-geh, “the man who walks on the
mountaintop”),45 his son John, and John’s cousin, the pro-assimilation Cherokee Phoenix
newspaper editor Elias Boudinot (Gallegina Uwati),46 had brokered a deal with Indian
Commissioners of the Jackson administration, General William Carroll and John

(2003) (discussing acculturation and miscegenation among Native peoples in the North American
southeast); and FAY A. YARBROUGH, RACE AND THE CHEROKEE NATION: SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (2008) (discussing themes of interracialism and identity in Native American
culture).
42
See GARY E. MOULTON, JOHN ROSS, CHEROKEE CHIEF 33 (1978) (noting Hicks particularly as Ross’
mentor).
43
See ROBERT J. CONLEY, A CHEROKEE ENCYCLOPEDIA 119 (2007) (following William Hicks’ short stint
as Principal Chief).
44
See generally MOULTEN, supra note 42. On the belabored decision to side with the Confederacy, see
Gary E. Moulton, Chief John Ross During the Civil War, 19 CIVIL WAR HIST. 314, 318 (1973) (announcing
at the Cherokee National Conference “the time has now come . . . to adopt preliminary steps for an alliance
with the Confederate states.”). Two-thirds of Cherokee men fought for the Union, however after the Union
troops abandoned nearby Fort Gibson, Ross (himself a plantation and slave owner) sided with the
Confederacy. After the war, the Cherokee Nation signed its last treaty with the United States, the punitive
Treaty of 1866. See History, CHEROKEE NATION, https://www.cherokee.org/about-the-nation/history/
[https://perma.cc/E9KH-6JF8].
45
See Brian Hicks, The Cherokees vs. Andrew Jackson, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 2011),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-cherokees-vs-andrew-jackson-277394/
[https://perma.cc/X5D7-7QZJ] (translating literally Ridge’s Cherokee naming into English). Ridge fought
alongside western Tennessee forces of General Andrew Jackson against the British and Creek Red Sticks in
the War of 1812. Jackson awarded him the rank of Major for the role he and his 500 Cherokees played in
defeating the Creeks in the 1814 Battle of Horseshoe Bend, and for negotiating Creek Chief Lamochattee’s
surrender to Jackson, which forced the cession of 25 million acres of Creek land (about one-half of presentday Alabama and one-fifth of Georgia) to the United States. For his efforts and in consideration of his land
holdings and business interests, Ridge earned the rank and title for which he thereafter became known. In
the 1820s and 1830s he served as Speaker of the National Cherokee Council. See The Life of Major Ridge,
CHIEFTAINS MUSEUM, https://chieftainsmuseum.org/2011/05/history-of-chieftains/ [https://perma.cc/B6B5GS3G]; See Indian Treaties and the Removal Act of 1830, ST. DEP’T. OFF. HIST.,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/indian-treaties [https://perma.cc/86BP-2R37].
46
See generally RALPH HENRY GABRIEL, ELIAS BOUDINOT CHEROKEE & HIS AMERICA (1941); CHEROKEE
EDITOR: THE WRITINGS OF ELIAS BOUDINOT (Theda Perdue ed., 1996).
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Schermerhorn. The deal concluded the Treaty of New Echota, which was signed on that
day.
The unofficial Cherokee ‘Treaty Party’, comprised of not one member empowered
to convene a National Council for such a treaty-making purpose,47 ceded ancestral land in
the southeast to the United States in exchange for five million dollars, a promised
Cherokee-appointed delegate to the United States House of Representatives,48 and new
land 1,200 miles to the west; in and around present-day Tahlequah, Oklahoma. The treaty
extended citizenship to heads of households desiring to remain49 in line with treaty
provisions extended to the Cherokees in 1817 and 1819.50 However, Jackson later struck
that provision.51 Jackson’s rejection underscored the fundamental disjunction in the
American mindset, which did not view the Cherokees as “citizens to begin with even as
sovereignty was claimed over them.”52 They were not of the soil or the bloodline in the
same way the European presentations of jus soli or jus sanguinis claimed to be. A nebulous
category had to be constructed for them—domestic dependents. This category, at best,
made them quasi-sovereigns in need of tutelage and guardianship.53 This constructed
category of diminished capacity helped to overlook the Treaty Party’s lack of credentials
and standing to conclude the New Echota Treaty. Domestic dependency asserted an
endemic quality of infancy to the character of Native Americans, which Europeans
assumed required guardianship. Guardianship, done partly for the good of Natives,
nevertheless required the contested means by which the settlers secured Native signatures.
In Jackson v. Wood (1810), New York’s celebrated jurist and soon-to-be Chancellor
of the Court of Chancery (1814-1823), James Kent, described the inapplicability of jus soli
citizenship to Native Americans as follows:

47

BROWN, supra note 5, at 499 (noting the right to call a National Council vested only in the Principal
Chief or his delegate).
48
Art. 7, Treaty of New Echota, supra note 2 (holding “[the Cherokee] shall be entitled to a delegate in the
House of Representatives of the United States whenever Congress shall make provision for the same.”). For
background, see Ezra Rosser, The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional
Delegate, 15 PUB. INT. L.J., 91 (2005). In August 2019, the Oklahoma-based Cherokee Nation and its
370,000 citizens (representing the largest of the three federally-recognized Cherokee tribes) announced its
intention to appoint Kimberly Teehee to serve as the Cherokee delegate. The treaty is silent on the question
of the delegate’s status as a voting or non-voting member of the House, should the measure take effect. See
Harmeet Kaur, The Cherokee Nation Wants a Representative in Congress, Taking the US Government up
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Their political relation to this state is peculiar, and sui generis. If they are
not aliens in every sense, because of their dependence as a tribe, and their
right to protection, they cannot be considered as subjects born under
allegiance, and bound, in the common law sense of the term, to all its
duties.54
This nuanced interpretation of jus soli connected the right of soil to the embedded European
understanding of fealty. This fealty attached to a sovereign authority framed according to
the features of European history, identity, political structure, and geo-space (specifically
land cultivation). The Scotsman in Calvin’s Case, although alien to England, shared a
common allegiance to the crown, thus entitling him to the same rights of ownership as had
belonged to the English. An unusual circumstance necessitated this extension of allegiance:
When Elizabeth I died without issue in 1603, the Tudor dynasty came to an end, passing
the crown to her cousin—the Scottish Stuart, King James VI.55 He unified Scotland,
England, and Ireland and ruled as James I, necessitating a reconsideration of common law
inheritance structure. The conveyance in Calvin’s Case established the jus soli principle:
“all persons born within any territory held by the King of England were to enjoy the
benefits of English law as subjects of the King.”56
Jus soli, once imported to the United States, carried with it a pre-existing fealty
condition that Natives simply could not possess, despite some later attempts at
assimilation.57 Abstractly, this element of jus soli bore some resemblance to the Spanish
Requerimiento (1513), which divinely ordained a right to possess the territories of the New
World based on theological qualities internal to Christendom, which were unknown and
unavailable to “savages.”58
III. THE RESPONSE
The complete southeastern cession of Cherokee Nationhood to the federal
government created paroxysms within the tribe. Ross denounced the instrument as a
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“pretended treaty,” “deceptive to the world and a fraud upon the Cherokee people.”59 A
petition denouncing the treaty collected 15,964 Cherokee signatures, which represented a
huge majority of the tribal population.60 Ross formally protested to the United States
Congress, describing the treaty as a denationalization and disenfranchisement “effected by
the . . . venerated . . . sacred appellation of treaty.”61
Ridge, however, viewed the treaty as a rational, political attempt to preserve
dwindling tribal sovereignty and cultural cohesiveness in the face of overwhelming odds.
Jackson had made this point explicitly clear in an 1835 circular addressed to the Cherokees:
“[Y]ou cannot remain where you are now. . . . You have but one remedy within your reach.
And that is, to remove to the West.”62 Ridge’s few defenders construed Jackson’s message
as the one-and-only option—a Hobson’s Choice.63 Jackson’s friend and Commissioner of
Indian Treaties, Alfred Balch,64 viewed removal as a charitable expression of stewardship.
He wrote to Jackson that “[r]emoval of the Indians would be an act of seeming violence;”65
it would prove to be in their interest as “[t]hese untutored sons of the Forest, cannot exist
in a state of Independence, in the vicinity of the white man. If they will persist in remaining
where they are, they may begin to dig their graves and prepare to die.”66 Historian Peter
Onuf argued that the “ideological rationale for an expansive republican empire” depended
on a self-serving logic establishing Indian removal as an expression of guardianship.67
59
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Ridge probably accepted Balch’s fatal conclusion, and the decision to remove came
at considerable personal expense given the sizeable business holdings he had to give up.68
History debates the suggestion that Ridge had no option but to sign the treaty. However,
Ross’ subsequent efforts to void the treaty also failed, suggesting that a violent fate awaited
the Cherokees in their encounter with United States regardless of the diplomatic pathway
taken to stay or go.69
Ridge also claimed that he signed his own death warrant by committing his name
to the treaty.70 His prediction came true, and not for him alone. On June 22, 1839, Ridge,
his son, and nephew were killed in closely connected attacks following a purported and
discreet tribal verdict of treason.71
IV. THE BETRAYAL IN BROADER CONTEXT
Considered fraudulent even among supporters of Jackson’s administration,72 the
United States Senate nevertheless ratified the treaty on May 23, 1836 by one vote.73
Prominent white opposition included important names;74 adding to the general resistance
movement arising in protest of the poor treatment of Natives that had spread among
Ridge’s decision to sign the treaty came with direct, personal costs to his land holdings and established
business interests in Georgia. He had been the third wealthiest Cherokee at that time, operating a 200-acre
plantation with 15-30 Black and Native slaves, a trading post, and a ferry across the Oostanoulah River. See
Cherokee Leader Major Ridge and the Indian Removal Act, GPB EDUC, YOUTUBE, at 2:00
(Sept. 12, 2019) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHkWHlmekPY.
69
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progressive communities and churches of the Northeast.75 Anticipating violence in the four
states overlapping with the Cherokee Nation, Jackson mustered 10,000 troops from
Tennessee, North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia to keep the peace.76 The ratification set
a two-year deadline for the Cherokees’ exodus. On May 17, 1838, Jackson’s successor,
President Martin Van Buren (1782-1862) issued the order to Major General Winfield Scott:
“cause the Cherokee Indians yet remaining in North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and
Alabama to remove to the West.”77 This directive commenced the “most notorious tragedy
of forced removal” that became known as the Trail of Tears (Nunahi-duna-dlo-hilu-I).78
The forced march resulted in the death of one-quarter of the Cherokee people.79 It
represented a stunning dénouement—the complete dispossession of 26 million acres of
ancestral land in Georgia alone, all taken within the first 40 years of the nineteenth
century.80 More than a historical act of betrayal, Cherokees commonly regard the treaty as
the cause of implacable problems that continue to beset the Nation.81
Many reasons contributed to the taking of the Cherokees’ ancestral hunting
grounds. Land speculation, Manifest Destiny, railroad barons intent on penetrating the
interior with roads and access lines, all combined as factors to put pressure on Cherokee
tribal holdings. Additional causes included the influx of frontier settlers, the 1828 election
of removal-minded President Jackson, the 1828 discovery of gold in Cherokee Territory
(in Dahlonega, northwestern Georgia), and the 1830 Indian Removal Act.82 By 1832, the
political and personal safety situation in Georgia had deteriorated to such an extent that the
Cherokees moved their capital from New Echota to Red Clay, Tennessee. The relocation,
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however, only delayed their forced removal by six years.83 More tragedy would follow the
diaspora. “Old Settlers”—Natives who had voluntarily removed to the West in 1805 and
1806 to preserve traditional ways—violently clashed with Ross’s later arriving
assimilationists over governance of the Oklahoma Territory, a clash that further and
perhaps irrevocably splintered the Nation.84
Indications of this diaspora stretched back for decades. However, the unsettled
political status of the interior beyond the Appalachians occupied more immediate attention
than resolution of the Indian question. This status involved competing French, British,
Spanish, and encroaching American interests. It first had to play out through the conclusion
of the French and Indian War (1756-1763); the promulgation of the Confederated
Congress’ Northwest Ordinance (1787), which outlined the process for admitting new
states northwest of the Ohio River;85 the Louisiana Purchase (1803);86 and the War of 1812,
which was fought in part over competing British, Native, and American claims to the
interior.
Equally unresolved throughout this period was the deeply conflicted early
Republican mindset toward Indian diplomacy. Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) often wrote
with great admiration of Natives,87 and of the melancholy sequel of their history.88
However, Jefferson’s idea of Indian removal:
had its origins in the long-held view that the migration of eastern Indian
tribes across the Mississippi River would be good for both whites and Native
Americans. It would provide economic opportunity for the former and give
the latter time and space in which to develop their potential for what the
Anglo-European mindset thought of as civilization.89
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Crucial to a general early republican understanding of civilization was the idea that settlers
should exercise dominium over the land by converting it from its natural state into
individually farmed plots of land.90 This conception differed from the mere occupancy and
transient hunting and fishing practices that conformed to European conceptions of Native
uses of vast communal acreage. Jefferson’s idea of introducing Natives to the “practice of
husbandry and of the household arts” was not only meant to avert the precarious economics
of subsistence, but it also intended to create a material association that more tightly bound
the natural world to the reasoned world of human interconnection.91 Jefferson “argued that
Indian peoples could only benefit by submitting to the discipline of the market, paying their
debts to merchant creditors, and exchanging portions of their vast land reserves for the
capital needed to make farms.”92
Jefferson seemed to prefer a policy of cooptation or gradual circumscription,
whereby Natives would “pare . . . off”93 and eventually integrate with the white society.94
They would take on debt (which would force them to sell off land), engage with trading
houses, adopt agrarian lifestyles, and possibly “in time . . . incorporate with us as
citizens.”95
Thomas Paine (1737-1809) expressed this cooptation in progressive, directional
terms. He emphasized the evolutionary movement from a natural state to a civilized state
as a process of land cultivation: “for though every man, as an inhabitant of the earth, is a
joint proprietor of it in its natural state, it does not follow that he is a joint proprietor of
cultivated earth.”96 In words foreshadowing Marshall’s discovery doctrine and the
assignment of dominium to those who “made it,” Paine wrote that “the additional value
made by cultivation . . . became the property of those who did it[.]”97 As Natives did not
make the Earth, their natural right to occupancy could not stand in the way of those who
added value to soil through cultivation, which Paine described as one of the supreme human
inventions.98 Jus soli thereby contained a subtle but essential qualitative component, a
component based on improving, clearing, and parceling of the land. Cultivation not only
added value and utility to the land, it generated taxable revenue for the sovereign. It
incentivized the right of inheritance, strengthened fealty to the political order, and
90
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promoted the vested interests of nationhood. Labor directed toward land cultivation marked
a key feature of progressivism in the early republican mindset, and it served as the emerging
Lockean basis for private property,99 as well as liberalism, in North America.100
Jefferson did not believe Native peoples could obstruct the pull of human history
from the natural to the civilized state. He labeled any such resistance “foolhardy.”101
Embedded in this logic was a view that Natives were misguided in their “sanctimonious
reverence” for ancestral customs, which treated reason as a “false guide,” and selfimprovement as a “perilous innovation.”102 According to Jefferson, ancestral thinking
marked the dominance of the Natives’ anti-Enlightenment view of progressivism. “[T]hey,
too, have their anti-philosophers, who find an interest in keeping things in their present
state.”103 Notwithstanding this view, Jefferson maintained a textured appreciation for the
plight of the Native people in view of the wrongs that had been committed against them.
He harbored an idea of recovering Native esteem from this process of cooptation, and yet
he could not escape from hauntings of “justice and fear” for “the injustices we have done
them.”104
V. LAND GRANTS, THE OHIO VALLEY, AND MORE FRAUD
The turbulent status of the interior, reflected at the outset by the three Powhatan
Wars between the Algonquin alliance and the first English colonists at coastal
Jamestown,105 belied the philosophical underpinnings of the discovery doctrine as a source
of sovereignty as much as the discovery doctrine abridged the political status of Natives as
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a resistance force. Contrary to the Enlightenment notion, the European discovery of
America did not immediately yield uncontested title “to those who made it.”106
Moreover, in 1763, a general design to monetize the North American interior
intensified. Britain’s King George III attempted by Royal Proclamation to prevent landhungry colonists from jumping over the Appalachian Mountains and settling into the
backwoods expanse of the Ohio Valley.107 This “claim-jumping” threatened to interfere
with the revenue-generating private enterprises established through previous land grant
charters from the king.108 The Proclamation attracted the support of the Shawnee Nation,
which later aligned with the British during the Revolutionary War to staunch
encroachments into Shawnee Territory caused by the overlapping and westward-stretching
colonial claims of Virginia and Kentucky.109 The alliance ultimately proved catastrophic
for the Shawnees, who unknowingly had all of their land ceded to the United States by
their British ally with the signing of the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which ended the
Revolutionary War.110 This lesson proved instrumental in forging Tecumseh’s (Tekoomsē)
confederated Native resistance movement during the War of 1812, in view of divergent
long-term political interests with the British and the superior military strength of the United
States.111
Land hunger and frontier expansion pressured Native populations and also created
territorial competitions and parity concerns among newborn American states. To quell
these emerging state competitions over control of the interior, states began ceding transAppalachian land originally chartered to colonies back to the crown’s successor, the United
States. Those transfers intended to end westward land competitions among the original
colonies over territorial claims that both “state and national governments lacked the
military power to enforce.”112
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Virginia began the charter cession process to the Continental Congress in 1784.113
Georgia perfected its transfer with the 1802 Georgia Compact, ceding Yazoo country (now
comprising Mississippi and Alabama) to the United States.114 In exchange, Georgia secured
a promise that the United States would use its constitutional treaty-making power to
negotiate the removal of remaining Native populations from Georgia “as rapidly as
possible.”115 When that effort stalled (over an extended 36-year period), Georgia took
matters into its own hands.
Removal could not happen fast enough for Georgians. As early as 1795, almost
every member of the Georgia legislature had conspired to sell land along the Yazoo River,
which debouches into the Mississippi River.116 This region comprised thirty-five million
acres of undeveloped land populated as Indian Reserve.117 The Georgia legislators set up a
scheme to purchase land from the state for cotton production as hidden investors in land
companies.118 The companies secured the land at prices well below market value and then
resold the titles at vastly inflated prices, creating a nationwide Gordian entanglement of
good and bad faith purchasers and resellers once the scheme unraveled.119 The profiteering
ignored Native interests even more than the political problem of dealing with Spain’s vicegrip over the port of New Orleans, through which exports of projected Yazoo cotton
commerce would need to pass.120 The graft scandalized the Georgia legislature and all
involved were voted out of office.121
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VI. THE FEDERAL BLIND EYE
A new Georgia legislature rescinded the Yazoo Land Fraud legislation in 1796.122
However, in Fletcher v. Peck (1810), the Supreme Court invalidated the reform-minded
Georgia legislature’s action.123 The Court let stand the fraudulent conveyances on grounds
of the United States Constitution’s Contract Clause.124 The Court reasoned that a binding
agreement under the Contact Clause could not be invalidated even if illegally secured.125
Although seemingly at odds with public policy, the strengthening federal view intended to
tamp down rampant beggar-thy-(out-of-state)-neighbor practices. The Court aimed to
uphold a national policy supportive of private transactional rights that states had been less
interested in honoring as among themselves.126
The holding served as a barometer of the unsettled relationship between federal and
state authority, which ultimately let stand the huge land fraud in order to preserve the
rational power of compact and private property “from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions to which men are exposed.”127 The strong passions of the case had been
stoked by states’ rights supporters, who essentially attempted to assert their jus soli
interests as derived from the 1802 Georgia Compact. The inability of the federal
government to uphold in timely fashion its part of the Compact—the removal of the Creeks
and Cherokees from a land space identified by the promoters of cotton culture—while at
the same time weakening a state’s authority over its own territory by invalidating a state
law, necessitated Georgia’s defense of the jus soli principle that would lead to the Treaty
of New Echota and the Trail of Tears. This case provided a foretelling glimpse at the
coming formalistic gloss that would honor the terms of the New Echota Treaty despite
overwhelming evidence of fraudulent dispossession. The right of soil attaching to federal
treaty-making power overrode the political practice that impeded the good faith
performance of compacts (pacta sunt servanda).
VII. CHEROKEES REFUSE TO MOVE
The Yazoo Land Fraud did nothing to abate other self-help efforts by Georgians to
secure Indian removal. According to historian Julie Reed, the political turmoil in Cherokee
Territory turned into an unrelenting “lawlessness . . . on the ground.” 128 Georgia land
sharks, claim jumpers, and squatters had already begun promoting the distribution of
122
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Native land through a series of land lotteries beginning in 1805.129 The so-called Cherokee
land lotteries accelerated with two more lotteries in 1832 and another in 1833, and yet the
Cherokees refused to move.130 These lotteries ultimately sold off three-quarters of Georgia
to 100,000 white settlers at deeply depreciated prices.131 Ross complained directly to
President Jackson that the lotteries had been enforced by “[a]rmed bands . . . parading thro’
their country.”132
In 1828, Georgia declared its intention to take control of all Cherokee land.133
Georgia nullified the Cherokee Constitution, forbade the Cherokee Council to assemble,
and prohibited Cherokees from mining gold on their own territory.134 Vigilantes and land
speculators commonly coerced, defrauded, bribed or bartered titles out of the hands of
individual Cherokees. These conveyances turned the Cherokee Nation into a checkerboard
of holdings while simultaneously constricting the efficiency of Cherokee rulemaking and
the sense of personal security over remaining Cherokee homesteads.135 Following the New
Echota Treaty, the Georgia militia forced some Cherokees to pay back rent for squatting
on farms that they used to own.136
Ironically, Ridge had earlier “pushed a law through the Cherokee Council setting
death as the penalty for selling tribal lands.”137 This act may have unwittingly created for
Ridge the legal instrument that signed his own death warrant. Although intended to stop
the piecemeal loss of Cherokee territory by applying the death penalty to private
129
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transactions, Ridge later inverted that practice with the Treaty of New Echota, which
perfected the wholesale loss of tribal land through international agreement. The former law
embraced Cherokee legislative process, while the latter treaty circumvented the same.
However, both the Cherokee domestic penalty of death and the international treaty shared
a common point. The instruments indicated the growing intramural factionalism that had
come to split the Nation. This factionalism would further penetrate and ultimately fracture
the national identity politics of the tribe during its removal to land reserved for it in
Oklahoma, which had already been populated by Western Nation Cherokees in the first
decade of the nineteenth century.
VIII. APPEASEMENT STRATEGY
As had been the case with the Shawnees in their fateful alliance with Britain, the
Cherokee Nation’s identity was informed by interactions with the whites. Ridge served
under Jackson at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend (1814), which destroyed the Creeks’
military might and their calculated alliance with the British.138 Horseshoe Bend convinced
important other southeastern Natives peoples, particularly the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and
Choctaws, of the need to adopt a strategy of appeasement with the whites, realizing they
could not defeat them in war.139 As one of the largest and wealthiest tribes, the Cherokees
applied these strengths toward the creation of a proto-Indian state within the United States:
they alphabetized their language (with Sequoyah’s 1825 creation of a syllabary), achieved
mass literacy, adopted a written constitution in 1827, assimilated and acculturated as
Christians with the translation of the Bible into Cherokee, published a national bilingual
newspaper called the Cherokee Phoenix, and modeled legislative, judicial, and educational
practices on the American republic through support of separation of powers, bicameral
legislative structure, and church mission schools.140 They also adopted agricultural
technologies and sartorial styles of the white settlers.141 The agricultural improvements bid
up the cost of removal efforts and created the perception among Georgians that the
138
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Cherokee leadership had evolved into a “bourgeois planter aristocracy, much like the
Georgians’.”142 For their efforts they achieved recognition as one of the Five Civilized
Tribes of the American southeast,143 an appellation that ultimately failed to satiate United
States land hunger and expansion designs toward the Mississippi River.
IX. WHAT ABOUT WORCESTER?
Other problematic clashes between federal and state authority loomed large. In
1830, Georgia extended jurisdiction over previously exempted Cherokee Territory144 and
executed a Cherokee national named Corn Tassel who had been accused of murdering
another Cherokee in Cherokee Territory.145 Corn Tassel argued that he could only be tried
in the courts of his nation, and not by the courts of the State of Georgia. 146 The Supreme
Court granted his writ in error and issued a citation to Georgia to show cause for
proceeding, but the court never heard this element of the case.147 Georgia’s governor
referred the writ to the legislature, which resolved to “disregard every and any mandate
and process that should be served upon them,”148 a clear challenge to the meaning of the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.149 Accordingly, Georgia refused to recognize the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, refused to send legal counsel to argue its case before the
Court, and executed Corn Tassels immediately, thus mooting out the writ of error
question.150
Sensitive to the pro-removal sentiment of Congress, which had recently enacted the
Indian Removal Act, aware of the futility of seeking redress in hostile Georgia state courts,
and concerned about delay via an action launched in federal district court, the Cherokee
Nation then devised a plan to vindicate its sovereign rights through a direct appeal to the
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Supreme Court. It employed a provision of the Constitution that granted the Court “original
jurisdiction” to hear cases between a state and a foreign nation.151
The case Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia (1831) sought to enjoin Georgia
from enforcing its laws that after 1828 sought to restrict Cherokee sovereign authority.152
The argument before the Court turned on the basis of the supremacy of treaty law between
the United States and Indian nations as opposed to the state law issued by Georgia to
regulate Indian relations. Chief Justice Marshall noted that the Cherokee Nation consisted
of a state with an independent people, however, he hedged on the question of whether it
was a foreign state, owing to “peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere
else.”153 Significantly, Marshall drew attention in the Constitution to the term “foreign
nations,” which in his view did not include Native Tribes in relation to treaties because
another section of the Constitution regulated commerce with foreign nations “and with the
Indian tribes.”154 He concluded that the Cherokees were not a foreign nation within the
meaning of the Constitution.155 He reasoned: “if the Indian tribes are foreign nations, they
would have been included without being specifically named, and being so named imports
something different from the previous term ‘foreign nations’.”156 ‘Something different’
meant that the Cherokees (and each individual tribe) were a “domestic dependent
nation.”157 Marshall reasoned that:
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will,
which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases; meanwhile, they are in a state of pupilage. Their relations to the
United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian.158
Because the judicial power to hear original jurisdiction cases only extended to cases
between a state and a foreign nation, Marshall ruled that the Court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the Cherokees’ claims, and the case was dismissed.159
Soon thereafter, a more direct opportunity to secure the jurisdiction of the Court
arose, resulting in a clear-cut, 5-1 majority decision supporting Native sovereignty rights.
And yet even this case, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), again written by Marshall, could not
forestall the removal campaign.160
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The case came before the Court due to Georgia’s imprisonment of two white
missionaries for living in Cherokee Territory and refusing to obtain a state license to live
there.161 One of the missionaries, Worcester, also served in a federal capacity as the
postmaster of the Cherokee capital city of New Echota. 162 His federal status brought
directly into conflict the applicability of Georgia state law.163 The judgment asserted the
sovereignty of Native American nations as separate from the United States and “completely
separated from that of the states,”164 and the court held that the Cherokee Nation consisted
of “a distinct community occupying its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force.”165 This victory for the Cherokees included judicial recognition that the
Constitution vested authority in the United States government to regulate relations with
Natives and that “the treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory
as completely separated from that of the states.”166
Perhaps most important, Marshall nuanced and reformulated the discovery doctrine
principle that he articulated nine years earlier in Johnson v. M’Intosh.167 There, the Court
bestowed sovereignty (meaning the underlying fee title to the land of the New World) on
the European discoverers and conquerors of the New World using language that naturally
assumed the rational connection between Enlightenment values, Christianity, and
civilization.168 M’Intosh introduced the proposition that the proper chain of title over the
land occupied by Natives had to trace from this immanent principle of dominium embedded
in and created by the western legal mindset. Native peoples implicitly lost whatever powers
of external sovereignty they ever possessed by virtue of their incorporation into the United
States.169
161
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In the early nineteenth century maturation process of the Supreme Court, and with
regard to the Court’s role as a balancer of interests between competing congressional and
executive functions, the developing republican legal order adopted an internalist dimension
that sustained the rule of law through the judiciary’s own self-formed means of applying
core principles to ever-changing factual circumstances. The self-contained recourse to
these principles reflected the doctrine of immanence, which later in the century contributed
to the fuller expression of legal formalism.170 Legal formalism was a method that asserted
that mature, introspective, judicial analysis of legal principles could produce the one and
only solution to a case. Judges needed no supplements outside of the law itself to administer
justice. If the roots of formalism emphasized the role of the judge to find the applicable
legal principle to solve a dispute, they also embedded an often unexamined and pre-formed
importation of assumptions—actually not immanent to aboriginal Native experience at
all—which inexorably drew from the deep cisterns of the European jus publicum and
Christian Europe. The dogmatic assertion of the discovery doctrine, based on conquest and
Christian entitlement, created the unexamined proposition that the right of soil belonged to
the proper inheritors of New World title, the Christian Europeans themselves.
However, in Worcester, Marshall massaged his previous meaning of the discovery
doctrine by nuancing the idea that Native Americans “retained considerable inherent
sovereignty.”171 He adjusted his rationale because southern states, principally Georgia, had
aggressively constructed their own possessory colonial charter claims granted by the
original suzerain, the crown of England.172 Georgia based its claim on the M’Intosh ruling
and the descent of the chain of title conveyed by the crown charter. Georgia also had been
emboldened by the Supreme Court ruling in Harcourt v. Gaillard (1827), which affirmed
“[t]here was no territory within the United States that was claimed in any other right than
that of some one of the confederated states; therefore, there could be no acquisition of
territory made by the United States distinct from, or independent of some one of the
Nations’ Land rights in Canada and possibly elsewhere. See also Lindsay Robertson, Cherokee Cases
(1/3): Johnson v. M’Intosh, YOUTUBE, at 17:32 (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9etyRazLvk.
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states.”173 As the self-proclaimed successor of interest and as the landlord of territory
chartered to it,174 the Georgia General Assembly began enacting laws in 1828-1829 with
the intent of administratively absorbing Cherokee Country into four nine-square-mile
districts and subdivided land lots.175 Georgia’s legislative action did not depend on whether
the Cherokees removed from Georgia.176 Acting essentially as a leaseholder, Georgia
intended to change the terms of Cherokee tenancy by declaring that all Indian customs and
laws would be null and void after June 1, 1830.177
Marshall may have sensed that his core discovery doctrine principle had taken on
an unanticipated life of its own.178 He may have recognized that the aggressive assertation
of states’ rights could jeopardize a delicate, judicially-informed federation model that had
established the courts as the branch competent to pass judgment on the meaning of the
Constitution. The rising tension between the federal government and states as to where
originary title properly vested required judicial re-visitation.179 The significant yet oblique
outcome of the Cherokee Trilogy cases is that Native American rights were often subsumed
by discussions about competing federal-state rights to the soil, leading to an abridgement
of discussions about aboriginal title.180
In Worcester, Marshall elaborated on language employed in M’Intosh in order to
curtail Georgia’s bold assertions of state power. However, in crafting the Worcester
opinion, Marshall artfully avoided any mention of amending M’Intosh, possibly to avoid
undermining the nascent legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s self-designated competency to
serve as final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution.181 In Worcester, Marshall may
have crafted a cupboard into which over-extended invocations of the discovery doctrine
could be stored.
173
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Marshall reasoned in Worcester that the conveyance of title to land in the New
World contradicted the “extravagant and absurd idea” that the colonial “settlements made
on the sea coast” provided the license “to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea
to sea.”182 Such a thought:
[D]id not enter the mind of any man. [The land grants] were well understood
to convey the title which, according to the common law of European
sovereigns respecting America, they might rightfully convey, and no more.
This was the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were
willing to sell. The crown could not be understood to grant what the crown
did not affect to claim; nor was it so understood.183
Marshall construed the charter claims as “incompatible with the lofty ideas of granting the
soil, and all its inhabitants from sea to sea [to the new colonies] . . . . [T]hese grants asserted
a title against Europeans only, and were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of
the natives were concerned.”184 Elsewhere, Marshall wrote:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of
the coast of the particular region claimed.185
Of this decision, which condemned the “extraterritorial” reach of Georgia’s
legislature over Cherokee Territory,186 Jackson purportedly said, “John Marshall has made
his decision, now let him enforce it.”187 Stylizing the Supreme Court as a foreign court with
no right to enforce its judgment at the state level, Georgia’s governor refused to release the
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imprisoned missionaries from hard labor.188 The Jackson administration also sent
emissaries to tribes to inform them that the decision was incorrect, persuading the
Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Muscogee Creek to prepare to remove.189 Georgia and the
Jackson administration’s contemptuous refusal to recognize or enforce the Court’s
judgment quickly took on the ominous tone of a major constitutional crisis. However,
shortly thereafter, an even more imposing federal state crisis arose.
Southern discontent with a series of post-1815 protective tariffs, including the socalled 1828 Tariff of Abominations and the insufficient tariff reduction act of 1832,
prompted the South Carolina legislature to nullify the perceived pro-Northern federal
legislation and defy the collection of duties, bringing the nation to the “verge of Civil
War.”190 In an unscripted but obvious way, South Carolina invoked the condominium
understanding between Georgia and the Jackson administration over non-enforcement of
federal authority in Cherokee Territory and applied this rationale much more broadly to a
state’s non-enforcement of federal revenue collection and tariff policy. Turning a blind eye
toward state actions that threatened the federal treasury proved much more dangerous for
the Jackson administration than the blind eye it had turned toward a state’s administrative
dealings with Natives within its own borders. Jackson committed full attention to the
nullification crisis after pressuring the Georgia governor to pardon Worcester and his
fellow missionary.191
Described as one of Marshall’s “most courageous and eloquent opinions,” 192 and
“foundational” in terms of modern federal Indian law,193 the Worcester opinion precluded
state interference in internal tribal affairs without Congressional authorization. The case
also recognized that “tribes retained considerable inherent sovereignty” unless Congress
explicitly limited those rights.194 However, the reformulation of the discovery doctrine in
Worcester, which rejected the “extravagant and absurd” idea that states could extend the
license derived from colonial settlements to govern the peoples and lands from sea to sea,
See Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis,
39 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 519 (1973) (noting that the two Congregationalist missionaries “remained in the
Milledgeville penitentiary until ten months after the decision.”).
189
See Lindsay Robertson, Cherokee Cases (3/3): Worcester v. Georgia, YOUTUBE, at 19:31 (Nov. 7,
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzBVC2sTZ_U.
190
WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1816-1836, at ix (1966).
191
Jackson postured to resolve the Worcester stalemate in Georgia by negotiating a pardon for Worcester
(and co-defendant Butler) in order to concentrate attention on the South Carolina crisis. See generally
William F. Swindler, Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 7 (1975) (noting
Georgia’s and the Jackson administration’s attempts to ignore the judgment but mentioning the South
Carolina nullification crisis, which later led to the release of the missionaries). Displeased with Jackson’s
tactics, the Governor delayed the pardon until the last day before the Supreme Court reconvened for its next
term. See Robertson, Cherokee Cases: Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 169, at 18:58. See generally also
Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J.
S. HIST. 519 (1973) (noting they remained incarcerated until ten months after the decision).
192
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
193
Walters, supra note 171.
194
Id. at 131.
188

429

never fully developed due to compositional changes to the Supreme Court beginning in its
1836 term. With Jackson appointees in control, the Court found five occasions in the next
eight years to reinsert the Johnson v. M’Intosh standard that Europeans acquired the
underlying fee title to all discovered lands.195
X. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court recognized in 2020 that a fraudulent promise
awaited Natives “on the far end of the Trail of Tears . . . . Forced to leave their ancestral
lands in Georgia and Alabama, [they] received assurances that their new lands in the West
would be secure forever.”196 Recognizing a “sadly familiar pattern,” the Court lamented
that the promise often had been broken.197 When the “price of keeping [promises became]
too great, . . . [the United States] just cast a blind eye.”198
Casting new light on the blind eye, the Court ruled in McGirt v. Oklahoma that
about 19 million acres of land throughout much of eastern Oklahoma that had been
reserved for the Creek Nation since the nineteenth century remained a Native American
Territory.199 By subjecting the blind eye to the scrutiny of the roman law principle of ex
injuria jus non oritur (legal rights cannot arise from wrongdoing)200 the Court wrote:
“Unlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to
amend the law.”201 Legal scholars immediately hailed the decision as “a stunning
reaffirmance of the nation’s obligations to Native Americans.”202
Another forgotten promise also stood at the beginning of the Trail of Tears, a
promise of reciprocated good faith between the negotiating parties. The deal inducing the
removal of Cherokees to the Oklahoma Territory more than turned a blind eye to the
promise of federal representation in the United States House of Representatives, which
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remains a contested issue to this day.203 It also ignobly validated the exodus of Natives
from their ancestral nomos by turning a blind eye to a fraudulent treaty itself. If the blind
eye is a metaphor for valuing political expediency over the rule of law, one cannot help but
wonder how the atoning McGirt dictum impacts Marshall’s important expression of the
discovery doctrine in Johnson v. M’Intosh, which undergirded the fraudulent conveyance
of Native land through the politically expedient expression of immanent values of Christian
identity, European civilization, jus soli, and Enlightenment notions of land cultivation.
Perhaps the Jackson administration could have parried criticism by noting that the
legal personality of the Cherokee Nation depended on the Jackson administration’s
political decision to deal with the Ridge faction rather than the Ross faction—an adaptation
of the emerging doctrine of state recognition (known as the constitutive theory) that
conveys the legal personality of statehood on the purely internal political decision of other
states.204 However, the requirements of state recognition could only imperfectly apply. The
Jackson administration had already abjured the notion that a Cherokee State existed within
the United States due to its two-fold reliance on the discovery doctrine as articulated in
M’Intosh, and the “domestic dependent” status of the Nation expressed in Cherokee Nation
v. The State of Georgia. Furthermore, it would be anachronistic to apply the competing
theory of state recognition—the declaratory theory— to the situation at hand as this theory
arose in the 1933 Montevideo Convention and had not congealed in the nineteenth century
(despite a prolonged historical evolution).205 However, one of its four provisos required “a
capacity to enter into relations with other states,”206 which the Ridge faction did not
possess. The Jackson administration tacitly recognized Ridge’s lack of capacity to
represent the Tribe as it had already entered into negotiations with the Ross faction in
January 1835. Ross told Jackson the Cherokees would remove for a $20 million fee.207
Jackson deemed the amount outrageous.208 Ross probably proposed the sum knowing it
was a non-starter but thinking to buy time.209 Here, he may have made his “biggest
mistake”210 when he petitioned to allow the Senate to “grant us as liberal terms as the
Senate . . . would be willing to allow.”211 The Senate responded with an offer of only $5
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million and Ross’ rejection of the offer exposed his official delegation to charges of
stalling.212 To the shock of the Cherokee Nation, the Jackson administration rejected
further dealings with its Principal Chief, forced a fraudulent deal on the unofficial Treaty
Party, and then used the Treaty of New Echota to pay off political debts owed to states
restless with unmet charter-cession claims, anxious for cotton acreage, and suspicious of
federal overreach with fiscal and trade policy.213
These values vested the right of the soil in the beneficiaries of a metropolitan chain
of title, which declined unassumingly to the American-born progeny of the European
Enlightenment. The abridgment of Native interests privileged the European right of soil
over indigenous perspectives, and masked irregularities involved in the treaty negotiation
process because Cherokee resistance to the treaty was construed as an improper assertion
of title involving chartered territory to which Natives could only present a derivative claim.
This claim was never based on land improvement, or original fee title, but rather on the
assignment of a Native tenancy or occupancy designation provided at the ‘sufferance’ of
the true landlords, who became increasingly frustrated by the obdurate Native refusal to
remove.
Although revisited by Marshall in the Worcester judgment and forestalled in terms
of more textured explication due to the influx of Jackson-appointed Justices to the Court,
the discovery doctrine language of Johnson v. M’Intosh can be reduced, in essence, to the
following:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been
acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the
community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be
questioned.214
As powerful as the ex injuria principle is in relation to historically unkept and now partially
remediated promises at the far end of the Trail of Tears, it remains offset by an equally
powerful roman law principle that is embedded in the discovery doctrine—ex factis jus
oritur (law arises from the facts).215 The discovery doctrine was recognized by Marshall as
“the extravagant pretension” that cannot now be questioned. It is as if he were intimating
that one should let bygones be bygones. Such forgiveness was questioned by Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion in McGirt. He noted that unlawful acts remain unlawful despite their
factual reality and the sufficient vigor by which they are performed.216 It is as if he were
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intimating that remediation for injustice bears no date of expiration. What form a full
remedy may take remains a sublime question. Any complete answer will necessarily
encounter the memory of New Echota, the mausoleum ghost capital of the Cherokee Nation
located at the first step of the Trail of Tears.
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